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Responding to a Complex World: Explorations in Spatial Planning 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article discusses three aspects in relation to complexity theory. First, from an 
understanding of time and space specificities in the rise of theories, it discusses the wider socio-
political reasons that may account for the rise of Complexity Theory and its interest for 
planners today. The rise of the third sector in governance; the decentralisation of the nation 
state; the rise of informality; the exponential rise of information and knowledge in every sphere 
of human and non-human activity and the rise of new normative ideologies are argued to 
provide the social context for interest in Complexity Theory. Second, this article positions 
complexity theory within general social science theories and argues that complexity theory 
best suits the second order realm of social science theorisation. Third, this article positions 
complexity theory within planning theory and suggests that complexity theorists within 
planning might engage with the theory in three ways. These are by suggesting new ways of 
ordering of society and space by configuring or re-configuring planning systems in the first 
order; unravelling new opportunities for actors to work in society and space with largely self-
organised entities and finally by searching for and discovering new dynamics for systems in 
the first order in society and space.  
 
Introduction 
 
In an earlier paper, I attempted to position complexity theory within the systems sciences and 
there I argued how complexity theory constitutes a third-generation of thought in studying 
systems (Chettiparamb, 2013). Here, I position complexity theory within a general tradition 
of social science theorisation. I search for explanations of why complexity theory is 
increasingly coming into its own in planning now and show how research in complexity theory 
today has taken several ‘turns’ that could well map on to traditions of social science research. 
 
Complexity theory and its relevance have been largely advocated by authors within and without 
the planning discipline on the claim that society today is getting to be significantly more global, 
more complex (Urry, 2003), networked (Healey, 2007) and defined more so today by 
uncertainty (de Roo et al, 2012, Wezemael, 2010). Society has never been simple, local or non-
relational, but many would concur that the attributes have become ever more recognizable and 
pressing today. In 1973, Rittel and Webber argued for, what they characterized as the ‘wicked’ 
nature of planning problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973). The acceleration of uncertainty ever 
since has led to arguments for ‘deep uncertainty’ (Walker et al, 2013). Deep uncertainty is 
characterised by, for instance, the uncertainty of goals when actors cannot agree on the 
desirability, priority or consequences of particular courses of action and the uncertainty of 
means due to unclear system boundaries, system dynamics and unknown system inputs. The 
call now from within the planning discipline is therefore for more sophisticated theories and 
approaches within and of planning that can take these realities into account (de Roo, 2010; 
Innes and Booher, 2010).  
 
Theories in general are products of time and space and they gain popularity and credence within 
a wider socio-political and cultural context. Successive waves of theories have followed broad 
changes in society and gain prominence not necessarily because they are ‘new’, but more 
because they resonate better with ideas and world views current in a changing society (Kuhn, 
1996). Moreover, broad theoretical traditions seem to resonate across a great many disciplines, 
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be it modernism, post- modernism, baroque, romantic, and so on, reinforcing the claim to the 
dialectic relationship between the emergence of ideas and changes in society.  
 
Complexity theory is an umbrella term that encompasses distinct theoretical concepts and ideas 
(bifurcations, fractals, tipping points, autopoiesis and so on), which can trace their lineage back 
to one or other of the natural sciences. These concepts and ideas have in general emerged from 
observations of how systems behave over time when repeatedly subjected to feedback loops. 
As such they resonate with the genre of systems theories but are often referred to as ‘neo-
systems’ theories (Knorr-Ketina, 1981, Roberts, 2002, Chettiparamb, 2018), a break away from 
the rather discredited past history of rigid systems thinking. Luhmann (2006) for instance, 
charts the evolution of systems thinking as starting from the theory of closed systems to the 
theory of open systems and now the current period of ‘observing or self-referential systems’ 
(p.37). A question of how theories that emerge from the natural sciences can be applied to the 
social sciences is an important one, but is not addressed in this paper. This is one for the future. 
 
This article, explores four distinct but interconnected facets of the relationship between 
complexity theory and planning. First is the context for the emergence of the theory. 
Understanding this context helps a planning theorist to also understand the types of challenges 
that complexity theory responds to. Second, is the position of the theory in relation to structure 
and agency, two aspects of the social world that are regarded as fundamental to explain any 
change or stasis in the social sciences. Third, is the position of complexity theory within a 
hierarchy of theories that describe, interpret or normatively steer the social world. Appreciating 
the position of complexity theory with respect to structure and agency and other theories allow 
planning theorists to appreciate and position work within complexity theory in relation to other 
forms of explanation and other social science theories/concepts/models. Fourth, is to 
understand the ways in which planning scholarship has engaged with complexity theory. 
Mapping this allows planning theorists working with complexity theory to position their work 
in relation to one another, within the wide and often confusing landscape of complexity theory 
based explanations. In this article, I therefore answer each of the questions below: 
1. What is the context for the emergence of complexity theory and in what ways might it 
resonate with characteristics, problems and issues in current society?  
2. How can complexity theory be theoretically positioned within social sciences and its 
modes of explanations?  
3. In what ways have complexity theory informed ongoing research within planning? 
 
In the first section,the context for the emergence of complexity theory and its interest for 
planners are discussed. In the next section, forms of explanation in the social sciences in general 
are explored and an argument for Complexity Theory’s ambit viz a viz structure and agency 
and other theories in the social sciences are put forward. Finally, complexity theory is related 
to planning theory and broad approaches adopted by scholars in planning are summarised. The 
paper ends with a conclusion that draws together key arguments. 
 
Complexity theory – Why now? 
 
This section goes beyond a claim of society as increasingly complex to explain the emergence 
of complexity theory. It attempts to identify the specific factors that might explain the ‘why 
now’ question in order to guide planning theorists in understanding the kind of societal changes 
that complexity theory might help address.  
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Theories have been understood as products of their time and space. The relationship of science 
to society is now generally acknowledged as being circular, with dense feedback loops from 
society influencing the kind of science carried out. Details of scientific practice which include 
choice of problems studied and methodologies used to substantiate a theory have been shown 
to be shaped by forces operating outside the laboratory - forces ranging from the mental make-
up and experience of the scientist, to more institutionalised formal influences of funding, to 
chance and happenstance (Kuhn, 1996, pg 4). The general cultural receptivity to an idea has 
also been shown to play an important part in shaping the kind of science carried out, both in 
terms of the observations deemed acceptable for follow-up and also in terms of anticipation of 
support and recognition that society bestows upon the scientist (Toffler, 1984, pg xii, xii). The 
relationship is however reciprocal. Science also influences society (Toffler, 1984, pg xiv). It 
gives rise to metaphors, and shapes mental models that influence the socio-cultural realm, 
impacting on the manner in which we conceive of ourselves and the way we look upon the 
world (Outhwaite, 1994, pgs 20-37). The dialectic development gets entrenched first in 
academic and professional discourses and with time, it gets embedded more permanently in the 
formal, informal and symbolic interactions of society. This then has almost unconscious 
consequences on the ways in which we view the future, deem fit to deal with it and organize 
ourselves to carry on with our daily activities.  
 
Way back in 1973, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber argued that the nature of problems that 
planning had to deal with in their contemporary times could not be solved by the professional 
expertise available to planners then. The context for these problems that they highlighted in 
their seminal paper was: 
The test for efficiency, that were once so useful as measures of accomplishment, are being 
challenged by a renewed preoccupation with consequences for equity. The seeming consensus, that 
might once have allowed distributional problems to be dealt with, is being eroded by the growing 
awareness of the nation’s pluralism and of the differentiation of values that accompanies 
differentiation of publics. The professionalized cognitive and occupational styles that were refined 
in the first half of the century, based in Newtonian mechanistic physics, are not readily adapted to 
contemporary conceptions of interacting open systems and to contemporary concerns with equity. 
A growing sensitivity to the waves of repercussions that ripple through such systemic networks and 
to the value consequences of those repercussions has generated the recent re-examination of received 
values and the recent search for national goals (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p.156). 
They argued that the above context led to problems of goal definition and problem definition 
and their consequences for equity, which they famously characterised as ‘wicked’ problems 
(Rittel and Webber, 1973, p.155). While Rittel and Webber defined the nature of the problem 
and its characteristics, it was more than a decade later that Karen Christensen actually mapped 
planning styles across degrees of certainty regarding means and ends, suggesting that very 
different planning styles are required for different combinations of means and ends uncertainty 
(Christensen, 1985).  The above means-ends uncertainty has however now broadened to also 
appreciate concerns of uncertainty around adaptability to unknown circumstances, uncertainty 
over structural resilience/robustness of systems and uncertainty over feedback effects on 
systems over time. These in essence define what Walker et al (2013) term ‘deep uncertainty’. 
So, if the above issues are capturing our attention now, more so than ever before, then why 
now? 
 
Rather than a fully historic account, in this paper, I will focus on the last four decades during 
which time, in the main, Complexity Theory gained prominence within the social sciences. 
These are decades that have witnessed great social, economic and cultural changes, not just in 
the West, but also more globally. I discuss the main social changes that I argue have enabled 
the social sciences to embrace complex descriptions of the world and pay attention to concepts 
and ideas that perhaps better encapsulate the lived experiences of these decades. Each of these 
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factors may not be a full explanation in themselves and their relative relevance will inevitably 
change with geographical contexts. They all nevertheless contribute to an explanation to a 
greater or lesser extent.  
 
Western contexts have seen the gradual erosion of the welfare state and the top-down planning 
that accompanied it. The funding gap and the service gap that was left behind, was soon, 
wherever possible, taken up by bottom up and non-governmental, social enterprises, 
community organisations and self-help initiatives often referred to as the ‘third sector’ 
(Salamon, 1993, Borzaga and Defourny, 2003, Brandsen and Psetoff, 2006, Osborne, 2008, 
Billis, 2010). On the other hand, in non-Western contexts, the welfare state had never really 
been a strong entity and in the insterstices of the gaps left vacant by the state, localised 
initiatives formed and developed (Chettiparamb, 2006a). The proliferation of such initiatives 
then meant a landscape of distributed power, where horizontal power was as much a 
consideration as hierarchical power. This opened up question about how such entities form, 
sustain themselves and grow; how such self-organising initiatives are to be governed and to 
what extent; and more importantly for planning, how planning might be accomplished in a 
landscape of such varied non-state actors. There was little in planning theory hitherto to answer 
such new questions that were more noticeably arising.  
 
The demise of the welfare state was also accompanied by the fragmentation of the nation state. 
The rise of sub-national governments, devolved governments, supra-national governments and 
parastatals were becoming visible both in the West and the non-West. This changehowever 
wasfelt acutelyin the hitherto strong national contexts within Europe. Multi-level governance 
and inter-governmental coordination, together with partnership working with the private sector 
were to become part of the planner’s context in striving for and realising regional outcomes 
(Rhodes, 1994, MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999, Bache and Flinders, 2004, Mair, 2006, Jessop, 
2008). How then might a planner plan within this mosaic of organisational plurality wherein 
responsibilities are fragmented? Again, there was little in conventional planning theory that 
could help planners in dealing with the new reality. Complexity theory grapples with this 
situation in two ways. First, it draws attention to mututal interactions and feedback dynamics 
of distributed architectures of agency (such as in agent-based modelling) so as to model/predict 
future outcome from the relations. Second, is to draw attention to processes and network 
architectures of structural relationships and feedbacks within empricially defined systems that 
are no longer closed or open, but are also now described as self-referential (see Luhmann, 2006, 
Chettiparamb, 2014).      
 
The dispersed architecture of responsibility and the emergence of spontaneous self-organized 
initiatives was also of course accompanied by the ‘information revolution’ (Dertouzas and 
Dertouzas, 1998, Freeman and Louca, 2001). Data and information today is continuously 
produced, collected, analysed and consumed by governments, organizations, and individuals. 
The onset of the ‘knowledge economy’ (Boden and Miles, 2000, Dunning, 2002, Rodriguez, 
2002, Powell and Snellman, 2004), with the burgeoning of knowledge in every conceivable 
sphere be it the environment, economy, technology, health or any other sphere, paradoxically 
left even more visible the limitations of knowledge. The inconvenient incursion of ignorance 
and chance injected a good measure of unpredictability and risk into even the most carefully 
planned processes. How then could the planning system deal with information on the vast 
number of issues it intersects with, in a society that also demands evidence-based decision 
making? Complexity theory draws attention to ways and means of  designing and instituting 
systems that are no longer based on information processing capacities of a select few decision-
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makers/experts, but relies instead on feedback loops created through self-learning and self-
correction in a system of multi-layered distributed responsibility. 
 
The rise of informality in planning discourse is inevitable with the dispersion of responsibility, 
the undermining of top-down command structures, the demise of the welfare state and the rise 
of the third sector.  The recognition of the ‘informal’ has led to closer scrutiny of the concept, 
not just as the excluded zone of the formal, but also as the medium within and through which 
much of social processes and outcomes are realized (De Soto 2000, Roy, 2005, Perry et al, 
2007). The relationship of the formal and the informal is therefore increasingly called into 
question and with it the difficulty of planning for and in spite of informality. This then further 
contributes to the complexity that define current times. In its incorporation of distributed multi-
layered agencies with information processing and learning capabilities, in place of a top-down 
decision making structure, complexity theory soon attracted the attention of those working to 
understand the dynamics of the extra-formal as well.  
 
Ideologies arise from the socio-cultural and political economic contexts of particular places 
and times. It is not surprising then that ideologies that match the complexity of times should 
arise. Normative positions advocating ideals such as active citizenship, social capital and 
participatory democracy have thus complemented the rising complexification of society giving 
initiatives based on such ideologies normative validity. Planning as a profession too embraced 
these normative positions as it struggled to make sense of the complexity of the times (Stivers, 
1990, Chettiparamb, 2006a, Putnam, 2000, Pateman, 2000, Healey, 1992). Thus much of 
planning thought in the recent past has engaged with normative ideas of planning, especially 
in relation to questions of process. The ‘how’ of planning is justified by ideas of ‘why’ in 
planning, be it democracy, ideal speech situations, inclusiveness, active citizenship, equality, 
justice and so on as in ideas of advocacy planning, participatory planning, collaborative 
planning, and so on. Though challenged and critiqued on a number of levels, these positions 
continue to be relevant today. They do however leave an unexplored realm of ‘deep 
uncertainty’ as society goes though some of the changes and challenges described above.  
 
As argued above, complexity theory focuses on difficult to describe, understand and predict 
multi-layered and distributed learning systems and attempts to understand how they work; what 
opportunities for individuals, organisations and society are possible, and from a 
governance/planning perspective, how attempts to govern and plan might be accomplished. It 
can therefore be argued that the interest in complexity theory and what it can tell us is by no 
means accidental. It is instead, very much an outcome of the socio-political pressures of the 
times that we live in.  
 
In his 2010, book on planning and complexity, Gert de Roo suggests that “Planning Theory 
and complexity thinking are two different matters. It is therefore not easy to connect the two” 
(de Roo, 2010, p.19). This view rather problematically sees two different entities and sets forth 
an implicit aim to connect the two. However, planning thought has, in its evolution, resonated 
both with society as well as changing philosophical ideas in the social sciences, the arts and 
the humanities. Post modernism in art, architecture, the social sciences and planning too, 
followed from modernism in all these disciplines. With post-modernism came an increasing 
acknowledgment of diversity, history and ‘the particular’ opposed to the ‘universal’ placeless 
validity of the modernist agenda. Within planning, this gave impetus to the acknowledgement 
of different needs of different populations, and the differential impacts of hitherto ‘neutral’ 
planning initiatives on distinct population groups. It was the era of re-discovery of ‘the 
particular’ in multiple ways, including calls for the inclusion of often unheard voices in main 
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stream discourse. This led to arguments for communicative/collaborative/participatory 
methods to be part of mainstream processes of planning for projects and spaces. Post-
structuralism reflected the recognition of the disparate, subtle and sometimes positive workings 
of power through discourse, architecture, and everyday relations. Within planning, it gave rise 
to the unpacking of ‘governmentality’ and how governance is routinely achieved ‘at a distance’ 
and how power, now recognised as emanating from everywhere, structures everyday life. It 
was not long afterwards, that the recognition of the role and power of relations in enabling and 
constraining opportunities gave way to the analysis of networks in planning and the re-
discovery of the explanatory power of networks. Relational mapping and network architectures 
soon led to the awareness of inanimate objects, their role in networks and recognition of 
processes of network working through the rise of actor network theory in the social sciences 
and planning. As argued earlier, complexity theory, through the rise of interest in concepts such 
as self-organisation, resilience, fractals, autopoiesis, second-order initiatives and so on 
characterize contemporary additions to an already existing rich mixture of analytical lenses 
current within both the social sciences and planning. The theory thus is not a separate entity 
struggling to connect with planning theory, but is more of a continuation of knowledge claims 
responding to changing times. 
 
 
Structure-Agency and Complexity Theory 
 
While the above section has argued for why complexity theory has captured the attention and 
curiosity of some planners and social scientists, for planning theorists, a cognitive schema to  
position the theory in relation to other dominant theories in the social sciences is needed. This 
section positions complexity theory viz-a-viz the structure-agency debate. This debate is 
chosen as modes of explanation in social sciences are fundamentally linked to either of the two.  
 
Structure and Agency in the Social Sciences 
 
Wellman (1997) suggests five forms of social inquiry within structural analysis. These can be 
summarised as analysis where 1) behaviour is interpreted as a result of structural constraints; 
2) focus is on relationships between units; 3) the effects of patterned relationships of many 
members on one member of a structure is in focus; 4) there could be layers of structures and 
therefore layers of structural effects; and 5) there is a movement away from explanations that 
are reducible to individual actions. Structural modes of explanation are nevertheless criticised 
for its limitations too. For instance, Sayer (1992) points to an ‘intellectualist fallacy’ in the 
social sciences. Here the reporter or the scientist engaged in structural analysis, dealing with 
macro issues, when reporting on events or incidents tends to forget that for the actor or 
participant engaged in the activity, their goals are not clear, and the path taken is not a 
determined path but rather one prone to vulnerability or diversions. The ex post report produced 
compresses time, and strategies on the ground appear to be 
“routine and mechanical execution of well-defined, perhaps reified, ‘actions’ undertaken according 
to firm ‘rules’ and ‘roles’” (Sayer, 1992, pg 97).  
Then practical and tacit knowledge which are often guided by a ‘vague and unexamined 
practical consciousness’ (Sayer, 1992, pg.15) is by and large underestimated in academic 
discourse of structural explanations. Sayer points out that when the ambiguity of practical 
knowledge is ignored and instead codified in propositional form, a mistrust between ordinary 
people and ‘intellectuals’ can arise. Resigned to this issue to a certain extent, he argues that 
structural analysis must still not be done away with as then that would only admit actor 
accounts. A realisation of the limits of structural analysis is advocated:  
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“the above errors lie not in using structural analysis as a mode of abstraction but in using it as if it 
could provide concrete descriptions on its own; it provides a possible beginning to research but not 
an end” (original italics) (Sayer, 1992, pg 98).  
The focus is thus on stressing the incompleteness of a structural account to fully describe 
concrete situations even when they remain valid. As Sanyal (2005) argues planning in the top 
remain a critical institutional mechanism for initiating social change, which planners cannot 
ignore. Therefore rather than moving wholesale into a critique of top-down planning, perhaps 
we should be focusing more on how to improve this through innovative planning that aims to 
create new and alternate institutional mechanisms.  
 
Agency or action based theories stand in direct opposition to structural accounts as individual 
or organizational actor accounts are the objects of study. Giddens (1993) addresses the concern 
of whether a sociologist’s accounts of social conduct can be seen as ‘unnecessary and 
pretentious’ given that participants already know of their life. Two justifications are advanced 
for what in addition a study of social life can contribute. First,  
“no specific person can possess detailed knowledge of anything more than the particular sector of 
society in which he or she participates, so that there still remains the task of making into an explicit 
and composite body of knowledge that which is only known in a partial way by lay actors 
themselves” (Giddens, 1993, pg 137).  
The above composite body of knowledge relates also to the idea of ‘constructed universals’ 
advanced by Alexander (1990). Second, Giddens argues:  
“it is in any case not true that their [sociologists] endeavour can be no more than descriptive in 
character; their aim is to correct and improve upon notions used by actors themselves in interpreting 
their own actions and the actions of others” (Giddens, 1993, pg 137).  
For Giddens, though sociological concepts must pick up differentiations of meanings which 
are relevant to the accomplishment of day to day interaction, they  
“are in no way constrained to embody the same differentiations in their own formulation. …” 
(original italics) (Giddens, 1993, pg 160).  
Theoretical accounts of agency then might construct ‘universals’ from the particularity of 
agential accounts and in doing so might suggest concepts and theories that can encapsulate the 
generality which is instantiated in that agency. These concepts and theories might then 1) 
describe a much larger picture than what any one person or actor can provide, 2) present 
insights that the actors may not themselves be aware of, and 3) introduce concepts or models 
that ‘improve’ upon frames of reference that actors themselves might otherwise use. Therefore 
theory based on agential accounts can be descriptive, cognitive in terms of providing or refining 
insights, as well as innovative, in terms of constructing new references for practice.  
 
Connecting Structure to Agency in the Social Sciences 
 
The above descriptions divide structure and agency and ‘breaks up’ social science explanation 
as there can be at least two different explanations for practice and social life. It is not therefore 
surprising that attempts to bridge the divide soon appeared (Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, 1981). 
In this section, I review three attempts that seek to bridge this divide..The first of these – the 
theory of structuration - is the most well-known among planning scholars mainly through the 
work of Patsy Healey. The second – the notion of habitus - may be less well-known, the third 
– the strategic-relational approach - has not yet attracted much attention, though references to 
this are now starting to appear. 
 
Giddens’ structuration theory, sees structure and agency as mutually dependent and co-
constitutive. Here agents are reflective cognitive actors, constrained by structures that pre-exist. 
Agents however understand these structures and transform the rules around them which then 
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changes such structures. The changed structures in turn impact again upon agents and the cycle 
continues through a process of structuration over time.  
The concept of structuration involves that of the duality of structure, which relates to the 
fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of 
structure and agency (Giddens, 1979, pg 69)  
Structuration theory thus advocates for the mutual constitution of both and the recursive 
impacts of one over the other, which then transform both over time. Structure is imagined here 
at one level and there is no explicit conceptual space that mediates between the recursive 
influences of one over the other. 
 
The notion of ‘habitus’ by Bourdieu ‘breaks up’ the direct link between structure and agency. 
‘Habitus’ for Bourdieu is constituted by history, they organize practice without consciousness 
or will of the actor, but is also a product of pre-existing objective conditions, which we might 
term as structures. 
“The habitus – embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history 
– is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product. As such it is what gives 
practices their relative autonomy with respect to external determinations of the immediate 
present (Bourdieu, 1998, p.56) 
It is in Bourdieu’s work, though it precedes that of Giddens and was influential on Giddens, 
that we see a layered version of the social world. The habitus here though itself constituted by 
history, occupies a space between structure and agency. This introduces scale into the recursive 
relations.  Bourdieu uses ‘habitus’ to account for the anthropological sense of belonging, 
customs and rules that are almost second-nature to practical life without necessarily invoking 
wider what he terms ‘objective conditions’.  
 
With the strategic-relational approach of Jessop (2001), we get a multiple layered vision of the 
interaction between structure and agency. Jessop argues that structure and agency relate to each 
other not just over time, but through scale too, with multiple realms of structure as well as 
multiple realms of possibilities for agency. Even if one might not agree with the prescription 
of processes occurring at each level in the model, I suspect that many would agree that it offers 
a more accurate account of structure-agency interactions in the social world. 
 
Structure – Agency and Complexity Theory 
 
In this section, I relate complexity theory to the structure-agency debate and the idea of a multi-
layered scalar explanation. Scale is fundamental to complexity theory. The fundamental 
generative process in complexity theory, as mentioned earlier are the recursive feedback loops. 
The impact of each of these feedback loops can be observed in social phenomena be it in 
structures or agential action. I expand on this below. 
In the three attempts discussed above to connect structure to agency, the observer or theorist is 
‘removed’ from both structure and agency levels for she observes and can see the structure, the 
agent and also the interactions between the two. The position of the observer here is the realm 
of meta-theory which aims to theorise how structure and agency work together in the first level 
and what it then means for both. One can of course move on to further levels of observation to 
understand how the observer observes the first level. There is therefore the possibility for 
infinite regress in the layering constituted by infinite recursivity of observation.  
 
Studies of the meta–realm are now familiar throughout the social sciences. We have, for 
instance, notions of meta-governance (Whitehead, 2003), meta-bureaucracy (Fenwick et al, 
2012), meta-planning (Wilenski, 1981) and so on. We also have terms such as ‘second order’ 
deployed to describe layered dynamics in contexts including elections (Norris and Reif, 1997), 
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policies (Cho et al, 2005), change (Hall, 2011), competencies (Daneels, 2008). A layered 
explanation for understanding planning and governance can also be seen in Savini, (2018), 
Moroni, (2018) and Chettiparamb (2007, 2018). This realm of second-order observation is the 
realm of complexity theory. Concepts such as fractals, bifurcations, phase-states, attractor 
states, autopoiesis and so on, essentially are statements of an observer who observes how 
systems as a whole (inclusive of structures and agents in the first level) behaves. The theory 
therefore provides the theorist with conceptual tools for describing these behaviours. 
 
Complexity Theory and the nature of social knowledge 
 
Having shown how complexity theory relates to fundamental modes of explanations in the 
social sciences, in this section, I position complexity theory with respect to the types of social 
knowledge that it produces and the relation it has to planning theories. 
 
Diverse grounds for claiming scientific status for social knowledge are based upon conceptions 
of what count as goals for social science research. Zhao (2001, pgs 390-91) broadly classifies 
the goals of social science research into three – the nomological, the interpretive and the 
normative. For nomological theorists the goal of social sciences and thus social theory is to 
discover law-like statements that pertain to the social realm. Thus for Zetterberg  
“the assumption here is that sociology will eventually discover a small number of 
propositions that are valid in several diverse contexts…This approach represents what we 
see as the main task of the sociological theorist – that is the discovery of general 
propositions” (1965, pgs 8,9, quoted in Zhao, 2001, pg 390).   
Well within this goal is the mechanism-based approach in sociology, which aims to identify 
causal social mechanisms that will generate and explain observations and are thereby predictive 
in the sense that under like circumstances like outcomes can be expected. The interpretive 
approach opposing the nomological approach argues that the goal of social sciences is not to 
uncover any form of laws but is concerned with the interpretation of meaning and the 
understanding of ‘lifeworlds’ of actors. Thus for Taylor  
 “social theory is…..concerned with finding a more satisfactory fundamental description 
of what is happening. The basic question of all social theory is in a sense: what is really 
going on”? (1985, pg 91, quoted in Zhao, 2001, pg 390)  
Sociological theories here are then narrative tales. The Normative approach sees social theory 
more as linked to practice and hence asks questions of what ought to be. Theories in this vein 
seek to articulate and advocate for specific positions that can guide social action. According to 
Steven Seidman for instance,  
 “social theory relates moral tales that have practical significance; they embody 
the will to shape history” (1991, pg 132, quoted in Zhao, 2001, pg 391).  
 
The conceptual tools that Complexity Theory provides deals with the question of mechanisms 
of interaction in the observed system, addressing questions of ‘how’ systems behave rather 
than the normative directions that systems ought to follow (Chettiparamb, 2005). Authors in 
other disciplines have also noted this perceived ‘limitation’ of complexity theory. For instance 
Morrison, 2013 laments that complexity theory is silent on issues of values and ethics that are 
important for educational philosophy and Webb (2004) makes an attempt to provide 
Complexity Theory with a normative base in spite of the wider critique that prevails. Though 
within particular systems the implications of complexity theory might have normative value, 
this normative implication is not constant. For instance, while the analogy of the butterfly 
flapping its wings, associated with complexity theory, might be seen to embody normative 
value and hope in disciplines such as say health (Resnicow and Page, 2011), the theory in itself 
has been used to unravel mechanism of systems to explain for instance the spread of crime too 
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(Beesley, 2009). Thus, while normative thinking  is not entirely precluded in so far as 
complexity theory can be used in conjunction with normative positions, the theory itself 
provides answers to questions of ‘how’ focusing on the nomological.  
 
Complexity theory and Planning Theory 
 
Having positioned complexity theory viz a viz the general aims of social science knowledge 
production, in this section, I discuss planning theory in general and thereby argue for the place 
for complexity theory in planning theory.  
 
Bunge (1973) creates an epistemological hierarchy for theories within social sciences. The top-
most in this hierarchy is for Bunge mathematics and metaphysics. Both of these are abstract 
and thus devoid of content. They are thus qualified as meta-disciplinary. Third in the hierarchy 
is the level of the disciplinary sciences with theories of relevance to particular disciplines. 
These are less abstract but richer in substantive content. Systems theory is positioned as being 
less abstract than mathematics or metaphysics, but more abstract than the theories within 
disciplines (Boulding, 1956). Content wise they hover between the metaphysical realm and the 
disciplinary realm. Systems theories are therefore typically transdisciplinary in nature and cuts 
across multiple disciplines as does complexity theory. Bunge, in his “epistemological 
hierarchy” extends this further downwards to finally end in practices what he terms 
‘observables’. This hierarchy has been re-interpreted and modified by Zwick, (2001) who 
produce the following structure:  
 
 
 
Source: Redrawn from Zwick (2001). 
 
According to the above structure, theories can be built up inductively from lower level theories 
within disciplines by identifying isomorphisms between different theories or deduced 
deductively from higher level theories by adding substantive detail (Zwick, 2001). In an earlier 
publication, I have argued that abstraction is different from simplification. Abstraction makes 
a distinction between the general form of an entity and its specific manifestation. The general 
form continues to maintain validity in complexity of the specific context. Simplification 
however could result in the claim to the general form losing validity when the particularity of 
the situation is reintroduced (Chettiparamb, 2013). 
 
Schatzi (2001), argues that the notion of a theory when talking about practice may be when 1) 
it offers a general and abstract account of practices or when 2) a general and abstract account 
is offered to practice. This conception of theory is contrasted against the more commonly 
known understanding of theory as linked to explanation or prediction. Thus  
“systems of generalizations (or universal statements) that back explanations, predictions, and 
research strategies are theories. But so, too, for example, are typologies of social phenomena; 
models of social affairs; accounts of what social things (e.g, practices, institutions) are; conceptual 
Metaphysics/Mathematics
System Theories
General Theories within Disciplines
Specific Theories within Disciplines (Models)
Relations, Laws and Hypothesis
Observables
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frameworks developed expressly for depicting sociality; and descriptions of social life – so long 
as they are couched in general, abstract terms” (pg 4).  
The everyday practical sphere is the foundation of theorisation. As Maffesoli (1996, pg 136) 
points out  
“we find here the theoretical justification for the recent interest in the humdrum, the 
normal and the everyday; what is rejected often, like a subterranean centrality, provides 
a solid basis for the whole of sociology”.   
 
However, to be valid, lower level theories must be able to forge a link to higher level theories. 
Planning Theory is positioned between day to day practice (which seeks descriptive, cognitive 
and innovative aids that might help inform action, Forrester, 1993, 1999, Sandercock, 2000) 
and higher levels of theory from which it might derive conceptual/analytical categories. 
Planning theory can then by virtue of its position, contribute inductively to higher level more 
abstract explanations and predictions and also contribute deductively to  practice and 
knowledge accumulation. This is a parallel elaboration of Friedmann’s (1987) assertion of 
planning being a linkage between knowledge and action. The parallel assertion here is  
planning theory is a linkage between knowledge claims embedded in higher level theories of 
society per se and practice as realised in specific situations and contexts.  
 
This level of theory is not occupied by planning alone. Functionally defined domains of social 
science such as economics, politics, or law have theories that occupy this domain. As long as 
the theories in these domains take off from a common conception of society, there is 
considerable overlap between the domains. What planning lays exclusive claim to is however 
the future, be it in terms of social reform, policy analysis, social learning or social mobilization 
(Friedmann, 1987), what Camhis (1979) terms as theories of planning as opposed to theories 
in planning. Theories in planning may come about through different streams with which 
planning engages, but theories of planning deal more with what can be termed as ‘content less’ 
entities such as ‘objectives’, ‘goals’, ‘actions’, ‘decisions’ etc which as Camhis argues, assume 
a substance of their own, and thereby become objects about which theories can be built 
(Camhis, 1979, pg 3).  
 
Spatial planning is practised as a mode of governance with strong links to public administration 
in the ordering of space. It is also practised as a community driven non-governmental venture 
deeply embedded within local neighbourhoods. These two ways, as mentioned earlier, also 
reflect ways of intervening and governing in society i.e. first, by changing structural parameters 
through a top-down approach and second, by innovating and making a difference through 
bottom-up approaches using personal and organisational agency. Hetty van der Stoep argues 
that spatial planning has evolved from planning for society (top-down planning by an ‘expert’ 
often technocratic), to planning with society (planning with communities by acknowledging 
the need for shared knowledge often using collaborative/participatory methods) and now to 
planning by society (van der Stoep, 2013) where planners concede power and steer active 
participation and leadership by others in society. Complexity theory informs the latter space of 
planning by society. They are therefore theories both in and of planning (Camhis, 1973).   
 
Planning thought influenced by complexity theory might engage with structural ideas in the 
second-order, for ordering space. In other words, it would ask questions about how might 
whole planning systems be designed to enable the self-evolving ordering of space in specified 
directions. It might also engage with agential interests and enquire into how understandings of 
system dynamics in the second-order might prompt actors to act in ways that enable self-
organized initiatives to evolve in certain ways. Planning thought has also focused on 
discovering complex system dynamics in space with the help of computational models. The 
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above three modes describe planning theorists engagement with complexity theory in order to 
improve planning practice. 
 
Concepts and ideas associated with complexity theory may cut across all three modes. For 
instance, the computational side of planning, might discover and reveal fractal patterns in city 
growth or spatial forms and suggest how this comes to be (Batty, 2013). The environment 
within the model allow a stylised and sometimes simplified isolation and thus discovery of 
particular dynamics in complex systems that are difficult to recognise in the messy real world. 
It allows the discovery of the ‘what’, without always necessarily engaging with the ‘why’ or 
the ‘so what’. The insights on ‘what’ dynamics however can potentially inform planning in 
triggering further enquiries. For instance, planning thought working with structural 
interventions might identify the ‘why’, the ‘how’ and the ‘so what’ after having recognised and 
identified such fractal forms in real life governance and space contexts (see for instance 
Chettiparamb 2013, 2005 for the how and why and Chettiparamb 2011 for the ‘so what?’ 
questions). Fractals might also inform agency by suggesting ways in which a planner might 
make a difference within existing institutional architectures. For instance, the new vocabulary 
can draw attention to macro and micro network and system dynamics enabling the planner to 
act as a network enabler or nurturer who strategically connects, stabilizes or enhances 
initiatives. The theory here cognitively widens the opportunity space. A similar argument can 
be made for other concepts too identified with complexity theory such as self-organisation, 
autopoiesis, fitness landscapes, attractors, bifurcations, phase spaces and so on.  As mentioned 
earlier, the theory answers questions surrounding mechanisms and interventions informing 
planners on ‘how to’, rather than providing answers to normative arguments. In being 
potentially able to provide answers for ‘how to’ questions however, the theory takes us forward 
by making an invaluable contribution to the realisation of normative positions, a gap that is 
quite significant today in planning theory, yet much needed to advance planning practice.  
 
To summarise I would argue that the questions for us who work in complexity theory and 
planning are three fold depending on one’s theoretical inclination and skills. On the structural 
side, the questions might be: 
 What new understandings and mechanisms for designing self-evolving planning and 
governance systems in order to steer society/space have complexity theory revealed? 
 What research agendas do the above suggest? 
Focusing on this aspect will allow the planner to exogeneously design appropriate institutions, 
laws, polcies and processes to ensue that self-evolving entities are nevertheless recursively 
steered through self-learning in a direction that they would not necessarily have adopted if left 
entirely to themselves. Expressed simply, it is the way that an institutional framework can be 
designed in which top-down processes and the bottom-up processes can meet and influence 
each other efficiently, effectively and continuously.  
 
On the agential side of planning, the questions might be: 
 What new understandings and actions for facilitating/dampening self-evolving 
planning and governance systems in order that these systems may plan for society/space 
have complexity theory enabled? 
 What research agendas do the above suggest? 
Focusing on this aspect, will allow the planner to position herself within a self-evolving system 
to consolidate planning outcomes by connecting parts horizontally, scaling in and out, and 
starting new feedback loops so as to influence self-learning processes and thus the evolution 
of institutional framings. Expressed simply it is the way in which a networked planner aware 
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of her scale of operation will strategically influence self organised entities realise planning 
outcomes without necessarily being the decision-maker. 
On the computational side of planning the questions might be: 
 What rules of the game, within what kind of environment, explain outcomes of 
independently acting agents and how does this inform the ordering of space/society?  
 What research agendas do the above suggest? 
Focusing on this aspect will allow the planner to discover hitherto hard to discern system 
dynamics in the social world and independently study how such dynamics might have a place 
in the multi-facetted causal explanations of spatial practices and outcomes.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to do three things. In the first section, I have reflected on the 
social conditions that could have enabled the rise of interest in complexity theory. I argued that 
the rise of the third sector in governance; the decentralisation of the nation state; the rise of 
informality; the exponential rise of information and knowledge on every sphere of human and 
non-human activity and the rise of new normative ideologies provided the social context that 
demanded fresh answers to new problems and thus the space for the interest in complexity 
theory. My second attempt has been to understand forms of explanation in social science theory 
and relate this to complexity theory, thus positioning the same viz a viz social theory. 
Traditionally the social sciences have been concerned with explanations from either the 
structural side or the agential side. There have also been attempts to provide a schema for 
connecting structure and agency. Three examples of how this has been attempted was reviewed 
and I argued that all three attempt to provide a ‘meta’ view point which has been influential in 
a number of applied areas including planning. I argued that this meta-realm is the level for 
complexity theory. The theory in all its concepts attempt a description of how systems work in 
the first order. My third attempt has been to position complexity theory viz a viz planning 
theory. In order to do this the level of explanation of theories in general was reviewed. It was 
pointed out that middle level theories such as planning theories, might deductively draw upon 
concepts and ideas from higher level theories including systems theories that are also 
transdisciplinary, or it might draw upon subject theories that are more disciplinary. It was 
pointed out that planning theory might also contribute to new disciplinary knowledge by 
inductively drawing upon practices.  
 
Finally, I argued that planning theory has always resonated with thought traditions in other 
disciplines and that complexity theory must therefore be understood within such a tradition. 
Thus complexity theory is no more separate from planning theory than any other previous 
traditions within planning theory. Complexity theorists within planning, working more 
structurally might work on understanding how complexity theory provides new understandings 
for steering systems in the first order. Those working more on the agency side might endeavour 
to understand how it provides new understandings for facilitating/dampening action in the first 
order systems. Complexity theorists in planning also work on discovering new concepts, rules 
and mechanisms that describe systems in the first order. 
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